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JUSTICIABILITY OF THE POLITICAL
OFFENSE EXCEPTION IN BILATERAL
EXTRADITON AGREEMENTS: TIME
FOR JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT
I.

INTRODUCTION

For several millennia, nation states have cooperated to bring refugee
fugitives to justice.' Beginning in medieval times, and up until the
nineteenth century, political refugees were the most common targets of
such cooperative efforts.2 Modern conceptions of liberty, propagated by
liberal democracies like the United States, have fostered a notion among
most nation states that politically motivated offenders ought to be protected
from those who seek their extradition.' To this end, virtually every
extradition treaty in existence today contains a provision rendering political
offenders nonextraditable; 4 this standard proviso is most commonly called
the "political offense exception."
The United States is a party to over one hundred extradition treaties. 5
Congressional legislation prescribes the proper rules and procedure for
extraditing an alleged offender to a foreign jurisdiction. According to this
statute, a judge or magistrate determines whether there is sufficient
evidence to sustain criminal charges, and if so, the Secretary of State is
warranted to surrender the accused to the requesting nation.'
1. The earliest recorded agreement to this effect was included as a provision in a
peace treaty between a Hittite King and an Egyptian Pharaoh, executed in 1280 B.C.
IVAN A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971), cited in Michael

O'Connor, Note, International Extradition and the Political Offense Exception: The
Grantingof PoliticalOffender Status to Terrorists by United States Courts, 4 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 613, 613 (1983).
2. Valerie Epps, The Validity of the Political Offense Exception in Extradition
Treaties in Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61, 62 (1979), cited in
O'Connor, supra note 1, at 613.
3. Michael R. Littenberg, Comment, The Political Offense Exception: An Historical
Analysis and Mode for the Future, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (1990).
4. Antje C. Petersen, Note, Extradition and the Political Offense Exception in the
Suppression of Terrorism, 67 IND. L.J. 767, 767 (1992).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1988).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1948), as amended by Act of Oct. 17, 1968.
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This procedure delegates the responsibility for resolving the issues
that arise from an extradition request to different branches of the federal
government. 7 This Note discusses how the authority to resolve these
issues is currently allocated, and more importantly, how this authority can
and should be properly reallocated through judicial self-restraint. 8
II. THE CURRENT ALLOCATION OF AuTmORTY
Although political offense provisions are often worded differently
from treaty to treaty, they are essentially identical in substance, 9 and the
federal courts have treated them as such. For example, the extradition
treaty between the United States and Canada has a typical, political offense
provision:
A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered, if the offence in
respect of which his surrender is demanded be one of a political
character, or if he proves that the requisition for his surrender
has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him for an
offence of a political character. 10
When faced with an extradition request from a foreign jurisdiction,
there are four main questions that the federal government must resolve: (1)
whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a charge against the alleged
offender; (2) whether the offense sought to be charged is political by

7. See generally SHEARER, supra note 1.
8. Specifically, this Note advocates invoking the form of judicial self-restraint known
as the "political question" doctrine, most clearly enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr, in dealing with this issue. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See also
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511

(1968).
9. For a full compilation of the extradition treaties to which the United States is a

party as of 1979, see IGOR I. KAVASS & ADOLF SPRUDZS, EXTRADITION LAWS AND
TREATmS, vols. I-II (1979).
10. Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., art. II, 27 U.S.T. 983, in
KAvAss & SPRUDZ, supra note 9, vol. I [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Treaty].
11. See Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932

(1978). "The function of an extraditing court is not to decide the guilt or innocence of
the fugitive at law, but rather to determine whether there is 'competent legal evidence
which . . . would justify his apprehension and commitment in [the forum] state.'" Id.
(quoting Collins v. Loisel [Loisel I], 259 U.S. 309, 315 (1922)). See also Quinn v.
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that extradition treaties require
a showing by the requesting nation that probable cause exists to support a charge against
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nature; 12 (3) whether the motive of the requesting state is actually to try
or to punish the fugitive for a political offense;13 and (4) whether
humanitarian considerations require the request to be refused because of
treatment the accused is likely to receive if extradited. 14 The power to
decide these issues is currently apportioned between the judicial and
executive branches of the United States government.
A. The Current Role of the Judiciary
Congress explicitly conferred on the judicial branch the authority to
decide whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a charge against the
accused. 5 This congressional grant of authority has been interpreted by
the courts as requiring the requesting nation to show that there is probable
cause to believe that the alleged offender did in fact commit the crime with
which he or she is charged. 6 In practice, however, the federal
government, via the United States Attorney General, usually authorizes a
United States Marshal to represent and act for the requesting government.
The magistrate will not order extradition unless the conduct complained of
is punishable criminally in both the requested and the requesting nations;
this is the doctrine of "dual criminality. "17
The question of whether probable cause exists is clearly within the
scope of judicial competence and expertise, as are the sub-issues of
jurisdiction and dual criminality. This Note does not advocate the removal
of this discretion from the judicial branch.
This Note does, however, question the authority of the judiciary to
determine whether any particular offense fits within the political offense
exception. 8 Neither the treaties nor the relevant federal statute clearly
assign this function to either the Executive or the judiciary. Some
commentators suggest that the statute assigns this task to the judiciary

the accused).
12. See U.S.-Canada Treaty, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
13. See U.S.-Canada Treaty, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
14. Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1107 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1036 (1980); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1988).
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184.

16. Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911).
17. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933); see also Quinn v.
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 1986); Caplan v. Volkes, 649 F.2d 1336, 1343
(9th Cir. 1981). See, e.g., U.S.-Canada Treaty, supra note 10, art. I.
18. See infra part III.
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since it authorizes the judge or magistrate to determine whether a charge
can be sustained "under the provisions of the proper treaty . . . .
However, this language is ambiguous: it does not expressly give the courts
jurisdiction to decide whether the exception applies. An equally plausible
argument is that this power is assigned to the Secretary of State since in
the same paragraph of the statute Congress stated that the Secretary of
State is to arrange for the surrender of the fugitive "according to the
stipulations of the treaty ...."20 Despite this statutory ambiguity and,
more importantly, despite the executive branch having had sole authority
over extradition matters prior to the enactment of the extradition statute,21
the courts have assumed jurisdiction to resolve this question. A century
ago in In re Ezeta,22 District Judge Moore explicitly rejected the argument
that the courts lack jurisdiction to apply the exception, 23 and the courts
presently continue to assert jurisdiction over these matters. 24
Inherent in the decision determining whether the exception applies, a
judge or magistrate must address issues of foreign policy and foreign
affairs. 2 These issues include: whether the offense took place during and
proximate to a political struggle or uprising between groups for political
control; 26 and whether the offense was committed in furtherance of the
uprising or struggle. 27 Additionally, an inquiry is often made into the
fugitive's motives, although motivation is not dispositive of the issue.28

19. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (emphasis added).
20. Id. (emphasis added).

21.

See M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

505 (1974).
22. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
23. Id. at 996-97. On the issue of jurisdiction the court held that "the duty of the
judicial authority is to decide whether extradition is due, according to law and the
evidence, and pursuant to the treaty ....
There is no limitation in this respect as to his
jurisdiction, and his duty is fully and accurately stated." Id.
24. See, e.g., In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 135-37 (2d Cir. 1981); Eain v. Wilkes,
641 F.2d 504, 512-18 (7th Cir. 1981).

25. This position was argued by the United States Government on behalf of the
United Kingdom in Quinn v. Robinson. 783 F.2d 776, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1986).
26. See Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 510 (1896); see also Artukovic v. Boyle, 140
F. Supp. 245, 246-47 (S.D. Cal. 1956); see also In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, 166
(the landmark British case that gave rise to the current standard applied by the United
States courts).

27. Ornelas, 161 U.S. at 511.
28. The court in Eain stated that "motivation is not itself determinative of the
political character of any given act." 641 F.2d at 520.
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This Note argues that these issues should be resolved by the executive
branch because: (1) they fall explicitly within the Executive's express
authority over foreign affairs conferred by the Constitution;29 (2) they are
far more appropriate for the Executive, via the Secretary of State, to
resolve;3° and finally, (3) they do not lend themselves to any manageable
standards.31
B. The Current Role of the Executive
If the judge or magistrate deciding an extradition matter finds that
there is probable cause and that the political exemption does not apply, the
Secretary of State nonetheless retains discretion to refuse extradition. 2
The discretion retained by the Secretary of State, however, is limited.
A standard sub-provision found within virtually every political offense
provision states that extradition shall be denied if the alleged offender can
show that the extradition request was made surreptitiously and with an
intention to punish the fugitive for a political offense. 33 Such a provision
requires the government to inquire into the motives of the requesting
nation. This inquiry must be made delicately and by a political body that
has a great deal of information-gathering resources and diplomatic
expertise. Quite clearly, this goes beyond the competency of even the
most learned judges and magistrates. Accordingly, it has been recognized
that the Secretary of State has complete autonomy in determining whether
a request is a subterfuge made to punish the alleged offender for a political
offense. 34 The Secretary of State is better suited than the judiciary to
make this determination because the State Department, as part of the
executive branch, is privy to more information crucial to analyzing
situations abroad and is, therefore, more likely to perceive the driving
force behind an extradition request. 5

29. See infra part HI.
30. See infra part lI.A.
31. See infra part III.A.
32. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 789 (9th Cir. 1986); Eain, 641 F.2d at 516
(citing In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1894)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1988).
33. See, e.g., U.S.-Canada Treaty, supra note 10.

34. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 789 (citing In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1915),
aff'd, 241 U.S. 651 (1916)).

35. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), the
Supreme Court explicitly recognized the executive branch's competency in foreign affairs.
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It should be noted that much of the information required to make this
determination would be very helpful to the judge who is charged with
determining whether the offense itself is of a political nature. However,
due to diplomatic concerns, much of this information must remain
confidential within the State Department;36 thus, a judge who seeks the
necessary information (if he or she even knows that it exists) will often be
unable to obtain it.
In addition to the Secretary of State's discretion to deny extradition
due to a requesting state's improper motives, she also retains the power
to refuse extradition based on humanitarian concerns. 7 It is often argued
before a magistrate hearing an extradition matter, or before a court on
habeas corpus review,3" that a request for extradition ought to be denied
because inhumane or unfair treatment awaits the fugitive if she is returned
to the requesting nation. Although this is a legitimate basis for refusing
a request, the courts have consistently recognized that it is a question
better suited to the Secretary of State, and have therefore declined to
entertain this argument. 9
Why have the above two issues been recognized as falling within the
purview of the executive branch? Presumably because the Secretary of
State has greater competence in this area than the courts. Why then do the
courts obstinately retain jurisdiction to decide whether the nature of a
crime is political?
III. JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT: THE POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE

The political question doctrine, most clearly enunciated in Baker v
Carr,4" is a form of judicial self-restraint. Under this doctrine, a case will
be found nonjusticiable if it involves matters that the Constitution has

36. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320; see also infra part III.
37. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 790.
38. Habeas corpus is the only procedural tool available to one who seeks review of
a magistrate's decision to extradite. See Gill v. Imundi, 747 F.2d 1028, 1039 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (quoting In re Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 501-02 (2d Cir. 1986)).

39. "[T]he degree of risk to [the fugitive's] life from extradition is an issue that
properly falls within the exclusive purview of the executive branch." Sidona v. Grant,
619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977)). See also Arnbjornsdottir-Mendlerv. United
States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[Sluch matters are to be determined solely
by the executive branch.").
40. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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relegated to a coordinate branch of government,41 if the resolution of the
issue requires a policy determination not within judicial discretion,42 or if
there is a lack of any manageable standards to guide the court.43 There
are other considerations that may disqualify a case under this doctrine,"
but those mentioned above are the strongest reasons for declaring the
political offense exception nonjusticiable. The first two rest on separation
of the issue
of powers concerns, and the third emphasizes the very nature
45
it.
resolve
to
judiciary
the
of
competence
involved and the
A. Separation of Powers
As previously noted, the political question doctrine requires the
judiciary to declare nonjusticiable any matter that has been textually
committed to another branch of government by the Constitution." The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Executive enjoys
broad power over foreign affairs 47 pursuant to the President's authority as
Commander in Chief, and his authority to make treaties, by and with the
consent of the Senate.4" The Court has acknowledged this general
constitutional delegation through a penumbras theory that is somewhat
analogous to the courts' recognition of a general right to privacy via
several more specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.49
41. Id. at 210-11.
42. Id.

43. Id.
44. For example, "the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. The "potential for embarrassment" theory
was argued by the United States Government on behalf of the United Kingdom in Quinn
v. Robinson. 783 F.2d 776, 788 (1986). The court rejected this argument and it will not
be discussed further in this Note.

45. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 396-98 (11th ed. 1985).
46. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
47. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
see also U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).

48. U.S. CONST. art. II., § 2.
49. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.

479 (1965), used a penumbras theory to invoke for individual persons a general right to
privacy stemming from the various Bill of Rights guarantees creating "zones of privacy."
381 U.S. at 484. For a general discussion of penumbras theory, see Paul G. Kauper,
Penumbras, Peripheries,Examinations, Things Fundamentaland Things Forgotten: This
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In United States v. Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court explicitly
recognized the Executive's dominant role in the foreign affairs context. 50
The case involved a Congressional Joint Resolution that authorized the
Executive to prohibit arms sales to nations involved in the Chaco
conflict.51 The power that this resolution gave the President would most
likely have been found an unconstitutional delegation of law-making
authority to the executor of the laws.52 The Court did not so conclude,
however, because the power given to the Executive related solely to
foreign affairs, a domain in which this department has premier authority.
Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, stated:
Not only ...

is the federal power over external affairs in origin

and essential character different from that over internal affairs,
but participation in. the exercise of the power is significantly
limited. In this vast external realm ...

the Presidentalone has

the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
alone negotiates. 5"

Similarly, in Oetjen v. CentralLeather Co. ,' the Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Clarke, made clear that the conducting of foreign
affairs is not a topic allowing for judicial intervention, but is committed
by the Constitution to the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government. 55
In light of the Supreme Court's repeated recognition and affirmation
of the broad executive foreign affairs power mandated by the Constitution,
it is difficult to justify the judiciary's retention of jurisdiction over political
offense exception issues. To determine whether a crime is by nature
political, the judge must: look to and comprehend conditions abroad,
decide whether or not there was a political struggle or uprising in the

Griswold Case, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 235 (1965).
50. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304.
51. Id. at 312.
52. See, e.g., Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
53. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (first emphasis added).
54. 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
55. Id. at 302; see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)
(stating that matters pertaining to conduct of foreign relations "are so exclusively entrusted
to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry.
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foreign jurisdiction at the time of the alleged offense, and decide whether
or not the actor's offense was in furtherance of that uprising. 6 Not only
do these inquiries relate to foreign affairs, but their resolution determines
whether or not the request will be granted, which is a delicate matter
inextricably bound to foreign policy and international relations. Because
the President is the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations, . .
,,s5 the courts must recognize that the determination of whether the
political offense exception applies is accorded to the Executive by the
Constitution, and declare it an inherently nonjusticiable issue.
Another basis for finding nonjusticiability is the impossibility of
resolving a matter without first making a policy determination that falls
outside of judicial discretion." As noted earlier, the "incidence test"5 9
requires a determination of whether a political uprising or struggle existed
in the requesting nation when the offense was committed,' and a
determination of whether the act committed was done in furtherance of or
incidental to the political disturbance. 61 Although it is true that judges may
often fill the role of fact-finder, these facts are often extraordinary, and
should, therefore, be left to the scrutiny of the State Department.
These factual findings require consideration of delicate and
complicated political matters. This is evidenced by the string of
inconsistent holdings reached by the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals in

56. This is known as the "incidence test," adopted from the British case, In re
Castioni, [18911 1 Q.B. 149, and followed, in an evolved form, to the present day by the

American courts. See In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894); Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161
U.S. 502 (1896); Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd sub nom.,
Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remandedper curiam,
355 U.S. 393 (1958); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

449 U.S. 1036 (1980); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 882 (1986); McMullen v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 788 F.2d 591 (9th
Cir. 1986).
57. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting U.S.
SENATE, REPORTS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, vol. 8, at 24 (Comm. Print
1816)).
58. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
59. See supra text accompanying note 56.
60. See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1036 (1980). "This circuit defines a political offense under extradition treaties as
an offense committed in the course of and incidental to a violent political disturbance..
." Id. (citing Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972); Jiminez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 560 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963)).
61. Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1104.
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the twentieth century.62 As the United States became less isolationist, the
courts have reacted by modifying the scope of the incidence test to allow
more flexibility in its application.63 This flexibility allows judges to factor
foreign policy considerations into their analyses, rather than apply purely
jurisprudential standards." For example, in In re Gonzales,65 Judge Tyler
explicitly admitted that the political offense exemption is applied "with
greater liberality where the demanding state is a totalitarian regime seeking
the extradition of one who has opposed that regime in the cause of
freedom."'
Because judges are supposed to be objectively detached when
resolving legal disputes, they ought not consider foreign policy matters in
resolving controversies, nor should they apply a different standard for
"disfavored" forms of government. The conduct of foreign policy and
relations is within the express Constitutional authority of the executive and
legislative branches: they are the "political" departments of government,
and their findings in this arena must be exclusive of judicial decision.67
Parties before a court deserve to be treated equally, without regard for
their relations with our country and their chosen forms of government. It
is time for Lady Justice to place her blindfold back on, and let the
diplomatic branch handle diplomacy.
The judiciary's role ought to be limited to determining whether
probable cause exists for sustaining a charge against the alleged offender.68
The task of determining whether the exception applies should be
reallocated to the State Department. In his opinion for the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Quinn v. Robinson, Judge Reinhardt wrote that
reallocating this task to the State Department is not possible. 69 He stated:
"We fail to see how the magistrate could determine whether there is
probable cause that the defendant committed an extraditable crime without
62. See generally O'Connor, supra note 1 (analyzing Circuit Court opinions that
arguably have inconsistent holdings on similar facts); Epps, supra note 2.
63. Epps, supra note 2, at 68.
64. Id. at 74.
65. 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
66. Epps, supra note 2, at 73 (quoting Gonzales, 217 F. Supp. at 721 n.9).
67. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (citing United States
v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610 (1818); Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307, 309 (1829); Garcia
v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511, 517, 520 (1838); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415, 420
(1839); In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 499 (1892)).
68. See supra part lI.A.
69. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 787 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986).
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determining whether the charged offense is one for which extradition is
prohibited [by the political offense exception]." 7 ° This assertion, however,
disregards that the two inquiries involve completely different questions.
A probable cause determination, made by weighing the evidence of
guilt on the record, is undoubtedly a judicial function. The question of
whether the exception applies, however, involves inquiry into conditions
existing in a foreign nation's political structure, not to mention the various
foreign policy considerations that are necessarily involved. Not only are
a probable cause determination and the political offense exception different
issues, but they are easily separated. The judge would decide whether or
not there is probable cause and stop there, as if it were an ordinary
criminal indictment. The factual overlap may be significant, but in most
cases would not be identical, and since the State Department would have
access to the trial record, no efficiency would be lost. As Judge Robb
recognized in his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic:7 "The conduct of foreign affairs has never been accepted as a
general area of judicial competence. [C]ases which would demand close
scrutiny of terrorist acts are far beyond [the] limited exceptions to the
traditional judicial reticence displayed in the face of foreign affairs
cases. "72
B. JudicialManageability
The "political question" doctrine also requires judicial forbearance
when an issue lacks judicially discoverable and manageable standards to
guide its resolution.73 The "incidence test," 74 as it has been applied, does
not reveal any discrete, manageable standards for the judges and
magistrates to apply in extradition cases.7" Rather, there is confusion and
disagreement among the courts as to what the standards are. 76 As Judge
70. Id.
71. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
72. Id. at 825. See also Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 77 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977) (warning that a "Serbian Bog" will face courts that inquire
into the policies of foreign governments).
73. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
74. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
75. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 801 (9th Cir. 1986) (pointing out the split

of authority in the American courts due to the rise of terrorism as a means to effect
political change).
76. Id. See also Michael R. Littenberg, Comment, The Political Offense Exception:
An HistoricalAnalysis and Modelfor the Future, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1195, 1220 (1990).
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Robb stated in his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic," "there is simply 'no justiciable standard to the political
offense,' and . . . 'there has been a tendency for a breakdown in the

ability of our courts to process extradition questions ..... "" The
incidence test requires finding whether the act that gave rise to the request
was committed in the context of a political uprising, revolution, or
struggle, and whether the act was committed in furtherance of that
uprising.79 This "test" has not proven to be as well-defined as it may
sound.
The first prong of the political incidence test, requiring that the act be
incidental to an uprising, has received varying interpretations from the
courts. ° For example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' affirmation
of the magistrate's decision in In re Mackin81 cannot be logically
reconciled with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Eain v.
Wilkes,82 although both cases were decided in the same year in light of the
same precedents. Mackin involved a member of the Provisional Irish
Republican Army ("PIRA") (a radical sect of the Irish Republican Army)
who had been charged with the attempted murder of a British soldier.83
His membership in the PIRA made him, in the eyes of the court, a
participant in a political uprising thereby rendering him nonextraditable, 4
despite the PIRA's commitment to the use of nonselective terrorist
violence to achieve its goals.
The Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") has goals similar to
those of the PIRA and employs similar tactics toward achievement of their
goals; however, in Eain, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of extradition when the offender was a member of the PLO. The
court redefined the uprising prong to require that the struggle be between
nondispersed military forces. The court found the PLO to be too

77. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
78. Id. at 826 (quoting Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 5227
Before Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
24-25 (1982) (testimony of Roger Olson, Deputy Asst. Attorney General, Criminal
Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice)).
79. See O'Connor, supra note 1, at 617-18.
80. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 801-03 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing the
divergent standards that have emerged in the courts).
668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
82. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
83. Mackin, 668 F.2d at 124.
81.

84. See O'Connor, supra note 1, at 628.
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dispersed to be recognized8 as
a rebelling group, and therefore held that no
5
uprising was taking place.
Another example of the uprising prong's unmanageability is the case
of Quinn v. Robinson. 6 In this case, three judges were able to reach the
same result, but disagreed as to the standard.8 7 Judge Reinhardt sought to
limit the uprising requirement by requiring that an alleged offender must
have resided in the requesting nation and have committed the offense
Judges Duniway and Fletcher expressed
within its territory. 88
disagreement with Judge Reinhardt's proposed limits, concurring only in
the result.8 9 The inability of these judges to agree on a standard further
demonstrates the lack of a definable and manageable standard.
As mentioned previously, the incidence test also requires that the act
be done in furtherance of a political conflict.9 ° This requirement has also
been inconsistently interpreted by the courts. 9 For example, in Eain, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that violent acts against civilians do
not qualify as "in furtherance" of the PLO's political goals.92 Other courts
disagree with this limit on the exception, such as the court in Quinn: "To
conclude that attacks on the military are protected by the exception, but
that attacks on private sector institutions and civilians are not, ignores the
' Thus, there are obvious
nature and purpose of the test we apply ....
inconsistencies in the application of this prong of the incidence test that
can lead courts to reach drastically different results on similar facts.
Concededly, many legal rules receive differing interpretations from
the courts, even though they have existed for decades. However, in the
extradition context, this uncertainty provides far too much latitude for
judges, allowing them to guide their decisions by subjective value
judgments of a political nature rather than by objective, manageable
criteria.

85. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).

86. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
87. For a discussion, see James L. Taulbee, Political Crimes, Human Rights and
Contemporary International Practice, 4 EMoRY INT'L L. REV. 43, 54 (1990).

88. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 807.
89. Id. at 818-21.
90. See O'Connor, supra note 1, at 617-18.
91. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 809 (Judge Reinhardt discussing different ways to
approach this prong of the incidence test, demonstrating that no precise formulation

exists).
92. Fain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
93. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 810.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The courts should declare the political offense exception
nonjusticiable, retaining only the authority to determine whether probable
cause can sustain charges against the fugitive. There are three rationales
that are relevant for purposes of this Note that justify precluding the courts
from deciding cases due to nonjusticiability. These are: (1) courts must
refrain from deciding issues that have been constitutionally relegated to
other political branches;' (2) courts must refrain from deciding issues that
involve a preliminary policy decision outside the judicial realm;9" and (3)
courts must refrain from resolving issues when courts lack judicially
manageable standards to guide their resolution.96 Each of these reasons,
individually and collectively, render the political offense exemption
nonjusticiable.
Commentators often suggest that such a declaration of nonjusticiability
is unnecessary because the Secretary of State retains ultimate discretion in
extradition matters. This assertion is not completely correct. It is true
that the Secretary of State can prevent extradition when a court has
ordered it;97 however, if the extradition request is denied, the Secretary of
State has absolutely no authority to order otherwise.9 8 This partial
discretion is inadequate to insure that the appropriate decision maker has
control.
are much more
It is also argued that "[a]dministrative decisions .
likely to be influenced by political elements than the decisions of the
courts."" This is probably true; but it is also exactly why the State

Department should have this authority.

With the rise of international

terrorism, such decisions ought to be governed by political considerations.
Deciding whether or not the exception applies often requires taking into
If foreign policy factors into the
account political considerations.
equation, then the branch of government assigned by the Constitution to
conduct foreign affairs ought to handle it, the branch that also has the

94. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).

95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 789 (citing Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 516 (7th Cir.
1981) (citing In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894))); 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1988).

98. See Epps, supra note 2, at 75-76.
99. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 789 (quoting C. VAN DEN
OFFENSE EXCErION TO EXTRADITION 100 (1980)).
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informational resourcefulness and diplomatic expertise that is required to
make these fragile and crucial decisions."
David A. Strauss

100. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (explaining that
the political branches of government have extraordinary power in conducting foreign
policy).

